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HARMONIZING FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE OF GOD’S
EXISTENCE IN ST. THOMAS
Daniel De Haan
Is it necessary for all Christians – including Christians who are 
metaphysicians with demonstrative knowledge of God’s existence – to 
hold by faith that God exists? I shall approach this apparently 
straightforward question by investigating two opposing lines of 
interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’s own response to this question. I 
shall begin with two texts from Thomas that motivate two incompatible 
theses concerning Thomas’s doctrine of the harmony of faith and reason 
with respect to the existence of God. Next, I shall clarify the salient 
points of disagreement between these two interpretations of faith and 
reason in Thomas Aquinas before examining dialectically a number of 
arguments in favor and against the respective theses of these two 
interpretations. In the final section I shall argue that the results of our 
dialectical inquiry reveal that the initial disagreement between the two 
positions is not irresolvable. Accordingly, I shall conclude by proposing 
two revised versions of the initial theses that emphasize the 
compatibility of these two interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine 
of the harmony of faith and reason.
1. Thomas Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and God’s Existence
Let us begin with the following question: can one and the same
person hold by faith certain matters that he also knows through a 
scientific demonstration? One representative text of Thomas’s answer to 
this question can be found in his Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q.
14 a. 9 (c. 1256-1259).1 The sixth objection runs as follows:
1 For the dating of Thomas Aquinas’s works, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1, The Person and His Works, rev. ed., trans. by Robert Royal 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005). All references 
to the works of Thomas Aquinas are taken from following editions: Sancti Thomae 
de Aquino Opera omnia, Leonine ed. (Rome, 1882 –); Vol. 22. 1-3, Questiones 
disputatae de veritate (=De Ver); Vol. 50, Super Boetium De Trinitate (=In De 
Trin). Scriptum super libros sententiarum eds. P. Mandonnet and M. F. Moos, 4 
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Opinion is farther from scientific knowledge than faith is. But we can have 
scientific knowledge and opinion about the same thing, as happens when 
one knows one and the same conclusion through a demonstrative and a 
dialectical syllogism. Therefore, there can be scientific knowledge and 
faith about the same thing.2
Thomas’s response to the sixth objection of De veritate q. 14, a. 9 
denies the conclusion that scientific knowledge and faith can be about 
the same thing. He supports his denial by rejecting the objector’s 
account of such cognitional attitudes as opinion (opinio), scientific 
knowledge (scientia), and faith (fides), and by appealing to his own 
account of these cognitional attitudes. Earlier in De veritate q. 14 
Thomas expounded his well-known account of the way in which the 
assent of faith differs from that of opinion, scientific knowledge, and 
other cognitional or propositional attitudes. Opinion is an intellectual 
assent to a proposition but with some hesitation that the contradictory 
proposition might be true; scientific knowledge is a firm intellectual 
assent to a proposition without any hesitation because the intellect 
grasps or sees why the proposition is true. In the case of both common 
and theological faith the intellect assents firmly to a proposition without 
any hesitation, however, the intellect does not see why the proposition is 
true; rather, the intellect is moved to assent, not by itself as in scientific 
knowledge, but by the will because some fitting good is obtained by 
assenting.3 Such distinctions are clearly operative in Thomas’s response 
to the sixth objection; he writes:
It does not seem possible for a person simultaneously to have scientific 
knowledge and opinion about the same thing, for opinion includes a fear 
vols. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-1947) (=In Sent.); Summa theologiae (Rome: 
Editiones Paulinae, 1962) (=STh); Liber de veritate catholicae Fidei contra errores 
infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles, t. 2-3. eds. P. Marc, C. Pera, P. Caramello 
(Rome: Marietti Editori, 1961) (=ScG). All translations are my own unless noted 
otherwise.
2 De Ver q. 14 a. 9 obj. 6. All English translations from Thomas Aquinas’s 
Questiones disputate de veritate are from Truth, trans. by Robert W. Mulligan, 3
vols. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952; Reprinted, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1994).
3 De Ver q. 14 aa. 1-2; STh II-II, q. 2. For introductions to Thomas’s doctrine of 
faith, see Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992); Stephen F. Brown, ‘The Theological Virtue of Faith (IIa IIae, qq.1–16)’, in 
The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. by Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2002), pp. 221–31; Bruno Niederbacher, ‘The Relation of Reason 
to Faith’, in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. by Brian Davies and Eleonore 
Stump, (Oxford University Press, 2012), 337-347.
HARMONIZING FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE 139
that the other part [of the contradiction] is true, and scientific knowledge 
excludes such fear. Similarly, it is impossible to have faith and scientific 
knowledge about the same thing.4
According to this short text Thomas quite clearly rejects that faith and 
scientific knowledge by one and the same person can be about the same 
thing, which would include the existence of God. Hence, it would seem 
that Thomas holds the position that it is impossible for one and the same 
person to have both faith and scientific knowledge of God’s existence at 
the same time.
But this view seems to admit of a few qualifications, for two articles 
later, in De veritate q. 14 a. 11, Thomas considers the query: is it 
necessary to believe anything explicitly? He provides an elaborate 
answer that distinguishes between implicit and explicit faith, as well as 
between what must be believed in various ways in different ages 
depending upon the deposit of faith revealed in one age or another. 
Thomas eventually comes to the conclusion that there are two things 
that everyone must believe explicitly in every age.
The faithful must explicitly believe something. And these are the two 
things that the Apostle says [must be believed]: ‘For he that comes to God 
must believe that He is, and is the rewarder to them that seek him.’ (Heb. 
11:6) Hence, everyone in every age is bound to believe explicitly that God 
exists and has providences over human affairs.5
On the face of it, this text from De veritate q. 14, a. 11 appears to 
contradict directly what Thomas just presented in De veritate q. 14 a. 9, 
ad 6. For in De veritate q. 14 a. 11 Thomas seems to be saying that 
everyone, metaphysician or not, must explicitly believe that God exists 
and is providential, but in De veritate q. 14 a. 9, ad 6 he said that it was 
impossible for one and the same person simultaneously to have 
demonstrative knowledge of God’s existence and also believe that God 
exists. Is there any resolution to these two apparently contradictory 
statements? The aim of this paper is to propose an interpretation of 
Thomas’s doctrine of the harmonization of faith and reason with respect 
to God’s existence that is able to negotiate between what appear to be 
two incompatible accounts. In order to accomplish this task we will 
examine various arguments for and against the following two 
incompatible theses concerning faith and reason in Aquinas.
4 De Ver q. 14 a. 9 ad 6.
5 De Ver q. 14 a. 11.
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Thesis-1: All believers must assent to the existence of God by 
faith, but one and the same person can simultaneously 
assent to this doctrine by both faith and reason
Thesis-2: All believers must assent to the existence of God, but it 
is impossible for one and the same person to assent to 
this doctrine simultaneously by both faith and reason
Thesis-1 favors the prima facie interpretation of the representative 
passage from De veritate q. 14 a. 11, over that of the De veritate q. 14 a. 
9, ad 6. To defend it one must find another way to understand what 
seems to be presented in De veritate q. 14 a. 9, ad 6 so as to bring it into 
line with Thesis-1. Similarly, in order to defend Thesis-2, which is 
clearly supported by Thomas’s statements in De veritate q. 14 a. 9, ad 6, 
one will have to find a way to soften the apparently contradictory 
statements found in passages such as De veritate q. 14 a. 11. In the next 
section I will first clarify the salient differences between these two
opposed lines of interpretation, then I will examine the arguments for 
and against these two views.
2. Fideist and Rationalist Thomists on Faith and Reason
It is important to notice that what is not under dispute is Thomas’s
relatively straightforward account of opinion, scientific knowledge, and 
faith. Both theses accept and assume Thomas’s clear-cut distinctions 
between these cognitional attitudes. Disagreement arises when exegetes 
begin to apply Thomas’s concepts of theological faith and scientific 
knowledge or reason to particular topics, such as assenting to the 
existence of God. In this section we will examine the ways the 
proponents of the two aforementioned theses understand the 
convergence of these principled distinctions between faith and reason 
and their application to the texts of Thomas concerning the 
compossibility of both rationally knowing and believing that God exists. 
Let us begin by distinguishing more precisely these two interpretations 
of Thomas Aquinas.
Among the deluge of secondary literature on this topic, it is not 
difficult to find the defenders of Thesis-1 suggesting that the adherents 
of Thesis-2 should be careful not to adopt a position that will ultimately 
lead them down a dangerous path towards rationalism. Similarly, those 
who reject Thesis-1 often do so because they think that accepting 
Thesis-1 brings its adherents too close to fideism. Such words of 
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warning are not without their merit, and the proponents of both views 
are correct to insist that we should be careful to avoid either extreme. So 
despite their differences there are underlying similarities in these two 
position’s criticisms of alternative interpretations of Thomas. 
Significantly, both interpretations share a common commitment to the 
view that Thomas Aquinas provides a robust and cogent doctrine of the 
harmony of faith and reason that avoids the errors of fideism and 
rationalism.
My aim is to uncover a still more precise interpretation of Thomas 
Aquinas by examining the competing claims for these two positions and 
adopting the strengths of both views. In order to sharpen the dialectical 
tension between the interpretations of the two theses, let us 
provocatively refer to champions of Thesis-1 by the misnomer ‘Fideist 
Thomists’ (=FT), as their critics contend that they tend to emphasize to 
excess the centrality of faith in Aquinas’s doctrine of the harmony 
between faith and reason. Let us call advocates of Thesis-2 ‘Rationalist 
Thomists’ (=RT) for they stress the independence of unaided natural 
reason’s ability to know by philosophical means alone the preambles of 
faith.
Fideist Thomists (=FT): Tend to emphasize, perhaps to excess, 
the importance of faith in revelation 
over purely philosophical 
demonstrations in Thomas’s doctrine 
of the harmony between faith and 
reason.
Rationalist Thomists (=RT): Tend to insist, perhaps to excess, on 
the ability of unaided natural reason to 
obtain knowledge of the preambles of 
faith by means of purely philosophical 
arguments in Thomas’s doctrine of 
the harmony between faith and 
reason.
Now despite such misleading labels it is important to recognize that 
FT and RT are not committed to fideism or rationalism, respectively. FT
clearly maintains that God’s existence and other such doctrines can be 
demonstrated by natural reason, and so consequently they reject a 
central claim of theological fideism that the only true knowledge 
concerning God is accessible by faith in divine revelation independent
of human reason. Likewise, RT holds that the doctrine of the Trinity, 
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Incarnation, and other such articles of the faith can only be known 
through faith in divine revelation and are absolutely necessary for 
salvation. Hence, RT rejects any form of theological rationalism that 
takes reason alone to be sufficient for our knowledge of God or for the 
attainment of salvation. 
Note also that FT and RT are not obscure or fringe interpretations of 
Thomas. On the contrary both FT and RT should be taken very seriously 
for they demarcate two well- known and clearly delineated lines of 
interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrines of nature and grace, 
reason and faith, natural and supernatural beatitude, philosophy and 
theology, and the preambles of faith.6 Accordingly, I shall adopt these 
6 For representatives of various versions of these lines of interpretation of 
Thomas Aquinas on faith, reason, and the preambles of faith see the following 
studies: Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, De Revelatione: Per Ecclesiam Catholicam 
Proposita, vol. 2 (Rome: F. Ferrari, 1950); Etienne Gilson, The Philosopher and 
Theology, trans. by Cecile Gilson (New York: Random House, 1962); Gilson, 
Christian Philosophy: An Introduction, trans. by Armand Maurer (Toronto: PIMS, 
1993), pp. 6-13; Gilson, Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, trans. by 
Laurence K. Shook and Armand Maurer (Toronto: PIMS, 2002), pp. 27–37, and pp. 
137-153; John F. Wippel, ‘Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Christian 
Philosophy’, in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas I, (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1984), ch. 1, pp. 1-33; Wippel, ‘Thomas 
Aquinas on Philosophy and the Preambles of Faith’, in The Science of Being as 
Being: Metaphysical Investigations, ed. by Gregory Doolan (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2012), pp. 196-220; Leo Elders, Faith and 
Science: An Introduction to St. Thomas’ Expositio in Boethii De Trinitate. (Roma: 
Herder, 1974); Armand Maurer, ‘Medieval Philosophy and its Historians’, in Being 
and Knowing. Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers 
(Toronto: PIMS, 1990), pp. 461–479; Maurer, ‘Etienne Gilson, Critic of Positivism’, 
The Thomist 71 (2007): 199-220 (pp. 219-220); Joseph Owens, ‘The Need for 
Christian Philosophy’, Faith and Philosophy 1 (1994): 167-83; Owens, ‘Neo-
Thomism and Christian Philosophy’, in Thomistic Papers VI, ed. by John F. X. 
Knasas (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1994), pp. 29-52; R.E. Houser, 
‘Trans-Forming Philosophical Water into Theological Wine: Gilson and Aquinas’,
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 69 (1995): 103-
116; Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology 
in Summa contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Christopher Martin, 
Thomas Aquinas: God and Explanations (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1997); Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas; Stump, Aquinas, ch.12, 
pp. 361-388; Denys Turner, Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Ralph McInerny, Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and the God 
of the Philosophers (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Press of America, 
2006); Rudi Te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa 
Theologiae (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); Thomas J. White, Wisdom in the Face 
of Modernity: A Study in Thomistic Natural Theology (Sapientia Press, 2009); 
Lawrence Dewan, ‘Communion with the Tradition: For the Believer Who Is a 
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two terms in an irenic spirit, for FT and RT provide us both with 
instructive notes of caution to avoid the extremes of fideism and 
rationalism, and with two sophisticated readings of Aquinas on faith and 
reason, that thereby help us set in relief real ambiguities in the texts and 
principles of Thomas’s thought.
At this point the reader might justly wonder who are the exponents of 
these rationalist and fideist versions of Thomism? But for two strategic 
reasons I shall not provide any examples of individuals who hold either 
view. First, the various promoters of these two positions do not identify 
themselves with these labels. Different representative authors articulate 
their own versions of these theses and their correlations and so it would 
require far more space than I have here to do justice to their respective 
views. Instead, I shall construe these two positions rather broadly and 
use them as foils that will propel the dialectic towards a more 
perspicuous interpretation of Thomas Aquinas.
Second, identifying who holds which position is really beside the 
point, and I think it can often obfuscate the real issues and be an 
impediment to dealing with the arguments themselves. I have provided 
in the notes an extended list of recent interpreters of Thomas Aquinas on 
faith and reason, and I leave it up to the reader to determine which 
thesis, if any of the two I have provided, is maintained by these authors.
For the remainder of this paper I shall explore the respective strengths 
of Theses 1 and 2 by examining the arguments FT and RT marshal in 
support of these theses and the objections they raise against each other. 
As we will see, such disagreements often bear upon how these two 
interpretations of Thomas understand various features of his divisions of 
propositional attitudes, most especially, the distinction between faith 
and reason. I will start with Thesis-1 as defended by FT, before 
considering RT’s response to FT and defense of Thesis-2.
FT’s Thesis-1 maintains that all the faithful must believe that God 
exists, and that one and the same person can simultaneously both 
rationally know and believe that God exists. This means that Thesis-1 is 
stronger than the claim accepted by Thesis-2 that one and the same 
person might initially hold by faith that God exists and then later in life 
become a philosopher who acquires demonstrative knowledge of God’s 
existence. Let us consider two arguments put forth by FT in defense of 
Thesis-1.
Philosopher’, in Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics. (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), pp. 387-399; Lawrence Dewan, ‘The Existence of 
God: Can It Be Demonstrated?’ Nova et Vetera, 10, 3 (2012): 731-56.
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Pro Thesis-1: Against Rationalist Thomism
Argument FT.1: Certainty and Merit of Faith
The first argument of FT presents a reductio ad absurdum argument 
against RT’s Thesis-2. Recall that Thesis-2 commits RT to the position 
that even though it is possible for a person to transition from faith to 
rational knowledge of God’s existence, say, when a Christian becomes a 
philosopher, it is impossible for one person to hold simultaneously by 
faith and by reason that God exists. FT challenges the latter aspect of 
RT’s position on the grounds that it seems to be inconsistent with 
Thomas’s doctrine that faith is both more certain and meritorious that 
scientific knowledge, which for FT entails that faith in God’s existence 
is epistemically more certain and more meritorious than philosophical 
knowledge of God’s existence.7
Now according to RT’s Thesis-2, if a Christian acquires rational 
knowledge of God’s existence then he can no longer hold it by faith. 
And since faith in God’s existence is epistemically more certain and 
more meritorious than rational knowledge of the same, then the believer 
who becomes a philosopher with demonstrative knowledge of God’s 
existence thereby becomes less certain of God’s existence and has less
merit than when they were merely a non-philosophical believer in God’s 
existence. But this conclusion is absurd, because one should not become 
less certain of a truth by coming to understand the philosophical reasons 
that support assenting to the truth of some position. Similarly, it is also 
absurd because it entails that it is more meritorious for a Christian not to 
seek to understand the philosophical reasons that corroborate their faith 
in the existence of God. Furthermore, this conclusion also clearly
contradicts Thomas’s teachings that extol the merits of the 
contemplative life.8 Hence, we should reject Thesis-2, and hold instead 
with Thesis-1 that because a person can know by faith and reason that 
God exists, one’s merit and certain belief in the existence of God is not 
diminished by also acquiring rational knowledge of God’s existence.
Argument FT.2: Faith Perfects Reason as Grace Perfects Nature
FT’s second argument draws on Thomas’s well-known doctrine that 
grace perfects nature, and within the order of propositional attitudes this 
means that faith perfects reason. Accordingly, the analogy is: just as 
grace is to nature so is faith to reason. Now if faith supernaturally 
7 De Ver q. 14 a. 1 ad 7; q. 14 a. 9 ad 7; STh II-II, q. 1 a. 7, et ad 5; STh II-II, q. 2 
a. 4, et ad 1; II-II, q. 4 a. 8 ad 1, et ad 3.
8 STh II-II, q. 182 a. 2.
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perfects reason, it does not impede but enhances what reason is already 
able to do naturally. But natural reason is able to demonstrate the 
existence of God; hence, the supernatural perfection of reason by faith 
does not destroy reason’s ability to demonstrate God’s existence, but 
amplifies it by allowing one to assent to God’s existence by faith as 
well. On this view, faith’s assent to the existence of God does not 
displace reason’s assent to the existence of God, for according to 
Thesis-1, the propositional attitudes of faith and reason are not 
incompatible with each other. But RT’s Thesis-2 entails the contrary 
view, namely, that the assents of faith and reason are incompatible and 
so faith does not perfect reason, but is replaced by reason. And this is 
obviously contrary to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Hence, we 
should adopt Thesis-1 instead, which maintains that the perfection of 
reason by faith involves not the corruption of one assent by the other, 
but the incorporation without confusion of both assents in one person 
who is able to assent to the propositions that ‘God exists’ both by faith 
and by reason simultaneously.
Contra Thesis-1: Against Fideist Thomism
Reply to Argument FT.1: Certainty and Merit of Faith
We must now examine RT’s critique of Thesis-1, but before doing so 
we will consider RT’s responses to FT’s two arguments. Concerning the 
first argument RT is willing to concede that faith is more certain and 
more meritorious than reason, but it claims that these concessions to FT 
neither bring us any closer nor make any clearer how we should 
adjudicate between the truth of Thesis-1 and Thesis-2. This is because 
even if Thomas holds that it is less certain and less meritorious to assent 
to the existence of God on the basis of reason instead of faith, this 
neither contradicts nor shows that Thesis-2 is absurd. All that FT.1 
reveals is that RT’s interpretation of the harmony of faith and reason by 
Thesis-2 is committed to one unfitting consequence, namely, that 
because it is impossible for one and the same person to believe and 
know that God exists at the same time, if a Christian comes to have 
philosophical knowledge of God’s existence, then his certainty and 
merit diminish insofar as he no longer has faith in God’s existence. In 
other words, if there is a harmony between faith and reason, then it 
seems unfitting that acquiring natural knowledge of what already is 
held by faith should diminish one’s certainty and merit.
Furthermore, RT also has available a counter-argument to FT.1 based 
on a number of distinctions provided by Thomas himself in his 
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treatment of faith from the Secunda Secundae of the Summa Theologiae
(c. 1271–1272). In Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 2 a. 10, ad 2, Thomas 
concedes that demonstrative rational arguments which establish truths 
that belong to the preambles of faith do in fact diminish the faith 
because they make ‘seen’ what had been ‘unseen’, and the latter is 
proper to the nature of faith. Still, such demonstrative knowledge does 
not diminish charity, because charity can still dispose the will to believe 
such truths if they were not ‘seen’ by a demonstration. This is 
significant, because Thomas holds that charity is the root of merit; 
indeed, even faith is only meritorious insofar as it is formed by charity 
in the will.9 Now since charity can be common to both the assent by 
faith and the assent by reason to God’s existence, merit is not 
diminished in the manner suggested by the first argument of FT.10
RT’s response to the first argument concerning the merit seems to be 
decisive. The merit of charity is not diminished just because a believer 
comes to have demonstrative arguments for a truth that belongs to the 
preambles of faith. But RT’s response to the argument concerning the 
certainty of faith is not particularly satisfying. While this response does 
clarify for us that the first argument of FT neither conclusively refutes 
Thesis-2 nor demonstrates Thesis-1, it does not soften the force of the
unfittingness of RT’s view on certainty that is exposed by the first 
argument.
Reply to Argument FT.2: Faith Perfects Reason as Grace Perfects 
Nature
The second argument of FT was more focused on the very nature and 
relationship of reason and faith, and so it also cut to the core of the real 
issue concerning the compossibility of faith and reason. RT’s response 
to the second argument concerning the way faith perfects reason 
proceeds in two stages. First, before we can understand how faith 
perfects reason we must provide a more precise account of what 
‘reason’ means in the analogy: as grace perfects nature, so faith perfects 
reason. Now reason is said in many ways, but what FT assumes without 
any argument is that reason must mean demonstrative rational 
knowledge (scientia). RT contends that this assumption is incorrect, for 
when Thomas distinguishes various kinds of cognitional attitudes, such 
as doubt, conjecture, opinion, understanding, scientific knowledge, and 
(common) faith, all of these forms of intellectual assent are rational acts, 
not just demonstrative scientific knowledge. So the more precise 
9 STh II-II, q. 2 a. 9.
10 STh II-II, q. 2 a. 10 ad 2.
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question is: which one of these six kinds of rational assent is ‘reason’ 
qua perfected by faith? And RT asserts that the answer here is quite 
obvious, for Thomas clearly maintains that the rational act that 
theological faith perfects is common faith.
This first point is significant, for the aim of FT’s argument was to 
show that because theological faith perfects reason – which FT assumed 
meant demonstrative knowledge – the two kinds of assent must be 
compossible, and so Thesis-1 is true and Thesis-2 is false. What RT’s
counter-argument has brought to light is that this assumption is in fact 
false. For the act of reason that is being perfected by theological faith is 
not scientific knowledge, but common faith. This point brings us to the 
second stage of RT’s counter-argument.
If we consider Thomas’s division of cognitive acts of assent, each 
kind of rational assent is incompatible with all of the others. Said 
otherwise, a person cannot simultaneously doubt the very same 
proposition that they assent to by a conjecture, hold as an opinion,
maintain by understanding, or assent to by scientific knowledge or by 
common faith. Each of these distinct propositional attitudes or rational 
assents excludes the others, which means that scientific knowledge by
definition excludes common faith, and vice-versa. Hence, because 
theological faith perfects reason qua common faith, and since by its very 
nature common faith is incompatible with the rational assents proper to 
scientific knowledge, understanding, opinion, conjecture, and doubt, 
theological faith is thereby also intrinsically incompatible with these 
other kinds of propositional attitudes. 
Consequently, if faith perfected reason in the way argued by FT,
namely, by making theological faith compossible with scientific 
knowledge, then theological faith would not actually perfect and 
enhance the nature of common faith, but would corrupt and deprive 
common faith of its very nature, which, for Thomas, is intrinsically 
incompatible with the other propositional attitudes, including scientific 
knowledge. So it turns out that it is FT’s account, and not RT’s that 
entails faith corrupts reason.
RT’s counter-argument to the second argument of FT is insightful and 
convincing. It does not decisively refute Thesis-1, but it does undermine 
FT’s account of the way faith perfects reason. What FT needs now is 
another way to frame the connection between faith and reason that 
shows they can be compossible without corrupting each other in the way 
articulated by RT’s counter-argument. But before exploring FT’s revised 
proposal, we must first attend to RT’s positive arguments in favor of 
Thesis-2.
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Pro Thesis-2: Against Fideist Thomism
Argument RT.1: Preambles and Articles of Faith 
RT’s first argument in support of Thesis-2 turns to Thomas’s 
distinction between the preambles of faith and the articles of faith. The 
articles of faith are those doctrines that God has revealed, that can only 
be believed, and which all of the faithful must believe, such as the 
Trinity and the Incarnation. God also reveals the doctrines that 
constitute the preambles of faith and so they too can be held by faith, but 
unlike the articles of faith, the preambles of faith are also knowable by 
natural reason independent of faith in supernatural revelation. These 
doctrines are called the preambles of faith because they concern 
doctrines that are presupposed by the articles of faith and which must be 
assented to in order to believe the articles of faith, yet they can be 
assented to either by faith or by reason. For example, in order for a 
person to believe the doctrine of the Trinity, that person must also 
believe that God is one; the former is an article of faith, but the latter is a 
preamble of faith because one can assent to the proposition ‘God is one’ 
on the basis of faith in divine revelation or by a demonstrative 
philosophical argument.
RT contends that this is the obvious way to understand Thomas’s 
distinction between the preambles of faith and the articles of faith and 
that it supports Thesis-2, not Thesis-1. The whole point of the preambles 
of faith is intended to clarify why certain doctrines can either be held by 
faith or reason, but not by both at the same time. Hence, the burden of 
proof falls upon FT to show that this prima facie understanding is 
inaccurate and that it is Thesis-1, not Thesis-2, that is compatible with 
Thomas’s doctrine of the preambles of faith.
Furthermore, RT observes that one of the most obvious corroborating 
examples of this prima facie interpretation of the preambles of faith can 
be found in question on the existence of God in Summa Theologiae I, q. 
2, a. 2. After showing that the existence of God is not self-evident in the 
first article, but before demonstrating God’s existence in the five ways 
in the third article, Thomas addresses whether God’s existence can be 
demonstrated in the second article. The first objection contends that 
God’s existence cannot be demonstrated because this is an article of 
faith, and articles of faith can only be believed. Thomas’s response to 
this objection unequivocally places God’s existence among preambles 
of faith, because it can be known by natural reason apart from divine 
revelation, and so it is not an article of faith. 
RT also points out that when such clear statements are read alongside 
passages such as the one we saw from De veritate q. 14 a. 9, which 
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concluded that, ‘it is impossible to have faith and scientific knowledge 
about the same thing’ it becomes difficult to understand how any reader 
of Thomas might even suggest that such passages are compatible with 
Thesis-1, which contends that a person can have faith and scientific 
knowledge about the same thing. 11 It is on the basis of such clear 
passages and many others that RT confidently maintains that Thesis-2
provides the only reasonable interpretation of Thomas’s account of the 
harmony of faith and reason, for FT’s Thesis-1 clearly contradicts the 
obvious sense of these texts.12
Argument RT.2: Violating the Principle of Contradiction 
The second argument of RT follows upon the exegetical point of the 
first argument, for it addresses the principles at work in the doctrine 
articulated by Thomas in these passages. Because this argument has 
been implicit throughout most of the foregoing it can be presented rather 
succinctly. Thesis-2 claims that it is impossible to have faith and 
rational scientific knowledge about the same thing, because the very 
nature of faith is incompatible with the intrinsic nature of rational 
scientific knowledge. Accordingly, to say otherwise, as Thesis-1 does, is 
to maintain a thesis that involves a contradiction. This is because it is 
essential to the nature of scientific knowledge to have a firm assent to a 
proposition with intellectual understanding of why that proposition is 
true, whereas faith by nature involves having firm assent to a 
proposition without having intellectual understanding of why the 
proposition is true. Hence, to contend that one and the same person at 
the same time can assent to the existence of God with and without 
intellectually grasping why it is true to hold that ‘God exists’, is an 
obvious contradiction, and Thomas Aquinas says as much in numerous 
places.13
At this point RT rests its case against FT upon whom it has rightly 
placed the burden of proof in this debate. Let us then consider FT’s
rebuttal to these arguments along with a number of rejoinders.
11 De Ver q. 14 a. 9, et ad 6; q. 14 a. 9 ad 8, et ad 9; q. 14 a. 10.
12 In III Sent d. 24 a. 2 sol. 1; a. 2 sol. 2; a.3 sol. 1; In De Trin q. 2 a. 3; q. 3 a.1; 
ScG I. 3-8; Ad Hebr c. 11 lects. 1-2; STh I-II, q. 67 a. 3; II-II, q. 1 a. 5 ad 3; q. 2 a. 4 
ad 2.
13 STh I-II, q. 67 a. 3; II-II, q. 1 aa. 4–5.
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3. Rejoinders
In this final section we will examine FT’s rejoinders to RT’s 
arguments in favor of Thesis-2. After each response we will consider a 
final reply by RT, and I will then add a few final observations before 
turning to the conclusion of our dialectical investigation.
Reply to Argument RT.1: Preambles and Articles of Faith 
FT’s response to the first argument of RT begins with an alternative 
understanding of the preambles of faith, and then provides a few key 
texts that justify this alternative interpretation. According to FT it is 
important to understand that the preambles of faith belong to theology, 
not to philosophy, and theology is the theoretical inquiry that follows 
upon the assent of faith. Theology is faith seeking understanding, both 
with respect the preambles of faith and the articles of faith. Now the 
science of theology consists in a subject, principles, theorems, and end, 
and it is according to the end, which is theological understanding and 
wisdom, that philosophy is incorporated into theology, for the end 
specifies the means. In other words, the end of theology provides 
sufficient justification for assimilating philosophy into theology as the 
preambles of faith. This incorporation does not entail that the 
philosophical doctrines sublimated into theology are no longer assented 
to on rational grounds, for just as grace perfects nature, so theology 
perfects philosophy. To be more specific, as the highest science, 
theology is able to incorporate the doctrines of the lower sciences, 
including the rational demonstrations proper to philosophy, yet without 
undermining their nature as based upon fully rational principles that can 
be understood by unaided natural reason. As employed by the 
theologian for the sake of understanding the truth of faith that ‘God 
exists’, such philosophical arguments rationally demonstrate the 
existence of God, but they do so without eliminating the initial faith in 
God’s existence. Instead, the assent of faith is amplified in certain 
respects by such philosophical demonstrations of the existence of God, 
for now the believer both has faith that God exists as a revealed truth 
and has philosophical knowledge that God exists as the first uncaused 
cause. But even with such rational philosophical amplifications of a 
truth known by faith, the rational knowledge of God as existing, as one, 
omnipotent, or providential still falls short of what is contained in the 
articles of faith concerning these truths. What the relevant differences 
are between the content of these two assents will be taken up in FT’s
rejoinder to the second argument of RT.
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Just as RT supported their account of the preambles of faith with 
various texts from Aquinas, so FT also appeals to its own corroborating 
texts. Two passages merit close scrutiny. The first is taken from De 
Veritate q. 14 a. 9, obj. 8 et ad 8.14 The objector seems to be arguing for 
some version of Thesis-1 only with respect to the truth that God is one. 
The objection runs as follows:
That God is one is included among objects of faith. But philosophers give 
demonstrative proof of this. Therefore, it can be known scientifically. So, 
we can have faith and scientific knowledge about the same thing.15
FT argues that if Thesis-2 were in fact true, then Thomas should have 
no difficulties stating precisely what he has said elsewhere in the many 
texts cited by RT in support of Thesis-2. Surprising, this is not what 
Thomas does in this particular response. On the contrary, Thomas’s 
reply distinguishes two senses of the proposition ‘God is one’. Thomas 
writes that,
We do not say that the proposition, God is one, in so far as it is proved by 
demonstration, is an article of faith, but something presupposed before the 
articles. For the knowledge of faith presupposes natural knowledge, just as 
grace presupposes nature. But the unity of the divine essence such as is 
conceived by the faithful, that is to say, together with omnipotence, 
providence over all things, and the other attributes of this sort, which 
cannot be proved, makes up the article of faith.16
FT contends that in this text Thomas identifies two senses to the 
proposition ‘God is one’. The first belongs to the preambles of the faith 
and it can be believed or known rationally through a philosophical 
demonstration; it consists in a limited account of what it means for God 
to be one, namely, that God is simple, is absolutely indivisible, is 
unique, and peerless, all of which can be known by philosophical 
demonstrations. But there is also a second meaning to the proposition 
‘God is one’ that belongs to the articles of faith and can only be held by 
14 This passage from De Ver q. 14 a. 9 ad 8 has inspired two recent studies that 
tackle the related question of whether Thomas holds philosophers can demonstrate 
that God is omnipotent and providential, see John Wippel, ‘Thomas Aquinas on 
Demonstrating God’s Omnipotence’, in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), pp. 194-217; 
Brian J. Shanley, ‘Thomas Aquinas on Demonstrating God’s Providence’, in The 
Science of Being as Being, pp. 221-242.
15 De Ver q. 14 a. 9 obj. 8.
16 De Ver q. 14 a. 9 ad 8. Cf. De Ver q. 14 a. 9 ad 5; STh II-II, q. 2 a. 4 ad 1.
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faith. This second sense of ‘God is one’ includes all that is present in the 
former, but also consists in a much richer and more precise account of 
divine unity, such as that God is Tri-une.17 In short, Thomas seems to 
make a subtle distinction between the doctrine of divine unity as a 
preamble of faith and as an article of faith. And FT argues that the only 
way to make sense of this doctrine is to adopt Thesis-1.
FT is also keen to point out that in this passage Thomas does not deny 
that there can be faith and rational knowledge of the same doctrine; 
rather, Thomas asks that we distinguish the two different ways of 
assenting to this doctrine, namely, by faith and reason. And even though 
in this text Thomas only explicitly mentions the doctrines of divine 
unity, omnipotence, and providence, there is a second passage 
concerning the same point wherein Thomas explicitly mentions God’s 
existence as belonging to the articles of faith.
In the Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 1 a. 8 Thomas Aquinas takes 
up a similar objection to the one from De veritate. In his response to the 
first objection Thomas again appears to distinguish between divine 
unity, omnipotence, and providence as preambles of faith from versions 
of these doctrines that are articles of faith.18 Significantly, this response 
follows upon the seventh article of question one which concerns 
whether the articles of faith have increased over the course of human 
history. Thomas’s answer eventually turns to chapter eleven of the 
Epistle to the Hebrews, which provides the minimal doctrine that all 
must assent to by faith in any age, for it contains implicitly the whole of 
the faith.
Similarly all of the articles are implicitly contained in certain primary 
believables (primis credibilibus), such as to believe that God exists and has
providence over the salvation of men, as according to Heb. 11 [6]: ‘He that 
approaches God, must believe that He exists, and that He rewards those 
that seek Him.’ For the existence of God includes all the things which we 
believe to exist in God eternally, and in which our beatitude consists; while 
17 A similar distinction applies to God’s providence. The doctrine of providence 
that belongs to the preambles of faith can be known by philosophical arguments and 
is limited to such doctrines as God creates the natures of all things and directs them 
towards their proper ends and the common ends of the universe. Explicit faith in the 
doctrine of providence includes implicitly everything that belongs to the articles of 
faith, that is, it covers all that is present in the former but also reveals much more, 
such as God’s particular attendance to mankind, His election of the people of Israel, 
sending His Son and the Holy Spirit, and so forth.
18 STh II-II, q. 1 a. 8 obj. 1 et ad 1.
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faith in His providence includes all those things which God dispenses in 
time for the salvation of men, and which are the way to that beatitude.19
FT argues that such passages reveal that there is a legitimate sense in 
which the believer can have both faith and rational knowledge of God’s 
existence so long as we distinguish between the doctrine as assented to 
by rational knowledge – which belongs to the preambles of faith – and 
the doctrine as it is only able to be assented to by faith – which belongs 
to the articles of faith. Despite the same words, the doctrines held by 
reason or by faith do in fact differ insofar as the believer’s faith contains 
doctrinally much more when he assents to God’s existence than when 
the philosopher assents to the existence of God. 
Hence, FT has no difficulty conceding that there are clear texts where 
Thomas seems to identify God’s existence and divine unity among the 
preambles of faith, because God’s existence and unity are both 
philosophically demonstrable. FT acknowledges this point; nevertheless, 
FT is also quick to point out that there are other passages wherein 
Thomas includes doctrines such as God’s existence and unity among the 
primary believables and the articles of faith, which cannot be known by 
reason, and must be assented to by faith.
Finally, FT contends this is precisely what Thesis-1 maintains, and so 
the force of the textual evidence that seemed to support RT exclusively 
has been seriously challenged. For FT has disclosed that RT failed to 
distinguish between the doctrines of God’s existence, unity, 
omnipotence, and providence as they belong to the preambles of faith 
from the similar doctrines that belong to the articles of faith. The content 
of the two doctrines are actually different in important respects, even if 
they are expressed using the same words. When the believer asserts that 
‘God exists,’ as an article of faith, he implicitly means more than what 
any philosopher means by asserting that ‘God exists.’ In short, RT is 
incapable of accommodating Thomas’s distinction between God’s 
existence as philosophically demonstrable preamble of faith and God’s 
existence as a divinely revealed article of faith.
RT’s Brief Rejoinder to FT’s Reply to Argument RT.1
The initial reaction of RT to this alternative account of the 
preambles of faith is to point out that this is a very specific interpretation 
of the way in which philosophy is incorporated into theology as the 
preambles of faith, and this is a controversial topic among Thomas’s 
readers. Now even if FT’s response provides an adequate account of 
19 STh II-II, q. 1 a. 7.
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how philosophy is related to theology – and RT is far from convinced 
that it does – this interpretation still fails to show how the 
compossibility of faith and scientific knowledge in God’s existence is 
accomplished as contended by Thesis-1.
As for the textual evidence, RT must either admit that it seems 
indecisive, or that perhaps there is a principled distinction that can still 
save Thesis-2. If the first, then we must leave this point with a 
promissory note, for it requires a comprehensive study of the relevant 
texts. The second option shall be entertained in our treatment of RT’s
second argument, but before doing so I would like to make one final
observation with respect to the debate over the preambles of faith.
Final Remarks on the Preambles of Faith
RT concluded their first argument by insisting that FT’s account 
of the preambles of faith do not provide any direct support to Thesis-1,
but the textual evidence from FT’s rejoinder has shown that the same is 
true of RT’s views on the preambles of faith. In short, neither 
interpretation of the preambles of faith decisively settles the dispute 
between Thesis-1 and Thesis-2.
Second, it also seems that the dialectic has revealed that the textual 
evidence alone is indecisive; though in terms of quantity there are far 
more passages that illustrate, at least implicitly, the point of RT’s
Thesis-2. Still, as we have seen, FT is not without important texts of its 
own that seem to support FT’s interpretation of Thesis-1.
Finally, what has come to light in this dialectic between the 
advocates of Thesis-1 and Thesis-2 is that some important disanalogies 
are being overlooked with respect to the analogical order of perfections 
to imperfections, such as the way faith perfects reason and theology 
perfects philosophy. We should not assume that each order is perfected 
in precisely the same way, for theology might well perfect philosophy in 
the order of a final cause, yet it seems more likely that reason is 
perfected by faith by way of a formal cause. For it seems that theology 
perfects philosophy insofar as it sublimates the natural end of 
philosophical wisdom within the higher supernatural end that consists in 
a faith inspired pursuit of theological wisdom; this is what allows 
theology to assimilate all that is truth in philosophy. But it appears that 
faith perfects formally the very act of reason, that is, it does not merely 
bestow upon reason a new end. For faith supernaturally enhances natural 
reason itself, and thereby allows reason perfected by grace to assent with 
certainty that the articles of faith are true because the Divine First Truth 
revealed them, even though reason perfected by grace does not 
comprehend why the articles of faith are true. This observation would, of 
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course, require a more detailed investigation to clinch the point one way 
or other; what should be clear, moreover, is that it is not obviously 
correct to assume that grace perfects nature in a similar way in each of 
these proportionally similar cases.
Reply to Argument RT.2: Violating the Principle of Contradiction
The second argument of RT concluded that Thesis-1 entailed a 
contradiction insofar as it claimed that one and the same person could 
both have faith and philosophical knowledge of the existence of God, 
for what philosophical knowledge is essentially excludes what faith is 
essentially, and vice-versa. The second argument also cited a number of 
texts that support this criticism of the first thesis, and so RT concluded 
that Thomas clearly maintained Thesis-2, and that the burden of proof 
rests upon FT to show that Thesis-1 is coherent and is supported by the 
texts of Aquinas.
As we have just seen, the texts provided in the first rejoinder by FT
do address latter desideratum. So even if these texts are not decisive for 
or against either Thesis, RT’s request for textual evidence has been 
satisfied. What about the first point? How can FT show that there is not 
a contradiction entailed by Thesis-1?
FT concedes that if RT’s portrayal of their position was accurate, then 
Thesis-1 would involve a contradiction; however, FT contends that their 
view has not been adequately presented, even if RT has provided a more 
precise account of the analogy of the way faith perfects reason. Recall 
that the principle of contradiction states that a thing cannot both be and 
not be simultaneously and in the same sense. FT’s claim is that RT’s
critique of Thesis-1 is based upon the false underlying assumption that 
the meaning of ‘God’ is the same in the proposition assented to by 
reason and the proposition assented to by faith. For there is one sense of 
‘God exists’ that belongs to the preambles of faith and can be assented 
to by faith or reason, but there is another sense of ‘God exists’ that 
belongs to the articles of faith and can only be assented to by faith. And 
because the meaning of ‘God’ is different for the two assents, it follows 
that there are not two assents to one proposition that is exactly the same 
in both its sense and reference. Both propositions might agree with 
respect to the being referred to, but what they signify about this being is 
formally different. Consequently, there is no contradiction involved in 
claiming one can assent both by faith and by reason to the proposition 
‘God exists’, and so there is no contradiction entailed by Thesis-1.
In support of this account of Thesis-1, FT turns to the texts quoted in 
the first rejoinder to RT wherein Thomas Aquinas clearly distinguishes 
between God’s existence, unity, omnipotence, and providence as 
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doctrines belonging to the preambles of faith – which can be believed or 
known by rational demonstration, but not by both simultaneously – and 
these doctrines as they are articles of faith – which can only be believed. 
But there are other aspects of Thomas’s theology that also support FT’s
account of Thesis-1, especially those pertaining to the divine names.
Thomas’s treatment of the divine names is nuanced and complex; FT
points to the following features of Thomas’s doctrine that are 
particularly relevant to the defense of Thesis-1. First, Thomas holds that 
the name ‘God’ indicates the divine nature as taken from his operation 
of universal providence. 20 Second, because this name ‘God’ is not a 
proper name, it is at least conceptually communicable by opinion, even 
though it is incommunicable in reality. But if a proper name were given 
to God that exclusively signified not the divine nature, but God’s very 
supposit, it would be incommunicable. Thomas suggests that the 
‘Tetragrammaton’ as used by the Hebrews is a proper name that refers 
to God alone, and, as FT points out, the Tetragrammaton is not a name 
that can be obtained by any philosophical demonstration; it is only 
known by faith in divine revelation. 21 Third, Thomas argues that the 
most proper name of God is not ‘God’ but ‘He Who Is’ (Qui Est), which 
God revealed to Moses as His name in Exodus 3:14.22 Thomas offers a 
number of corroborating reasons for why this is the most proper name of 
God. The most important one is that the Tetragrammaton signifies what 
is incommunicable and refers singularly to the being Who Is He Who 
Is.23 Now insofar as He Who Is is taken as a revealed name, then like the 
Tetragrammaton it is also inaccessible to philosophical demonstration. 
In other words, the philosopher can demonstrate the truth that God is 
subsisting existence in itself, but no philosopher can demonstrate the 
truth of God’s existence as it was revealed to Moses and which 
Christians assent to by faith.24
20 STh I, q. 13 a. 8.
21 STh I, q. 13 a. 9.
22 STh I, q. 13 a. 11; In I Sent d. 8 q. 1 a. 1 sol. 1; ScG I. 22.
23 STh I, q. 13 a. 11 ad 1.
24 Armand Maurer, ‘St. Thomas on the Sacred Name “Tetragrammaton”’, in 
Being and Knowing, pp. 59–69; Joseph Owens, ‘Aquinas: Darkness of Ignorance in 
the Most Refined Notion of God’ in Towards a Christian Philosophy (Catholic 
University of America Press, 1990), pp. 207-24. N.B. It seems to me that Thomas 
would also apply the aforementioned distinction between preambles of faith and 
articles of faith to the doctrine that God is Qui Est. This would mean that the 
doctrine that God is Qui Est can be known in a limited way by reason on the basis of 
our philosophical knowledge that God is esse ipsum subsistens, and can also be 
known by faith in revelation which contains doctrinally much more than the 
HARMONIZING FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE 157
Fourth, Thomas also addresses the manner in which we can affirm 
true propositions of God. In order to understand what God is not, we 
must employ many concepts drawn from the multiplicity of creatures 
that imperfectly imitate the perfection that God is super-eminently and 
without limitation.25 This diversity in our understanding is based upon a 
diversity found in creatures and is expressed by the subject and 
predicate. But the union and identity of these notions in the thing itself 
is signified by the intellect’s synthesis. In the case of God, we 
understand that the thing signified is absolutely simple, and that the 
complexity is only on the side of our mode of understanding.26 When 
we form propositions about God, the subject referred to is the same but 
our understanding of the subject varies depending upon whether we are 
affirming, say, that God is good or incorporeal.27 And some propositions 
affirmed of God will be true or false depending upon what we mean by 
the subject and the predicate.28
Accordingly, FT insists that when we say ‘God exists’, it is 
absolutely crucial to be clear about what we mean by ‘God’. If by ‘God’ 
we mean the divine nature as knowable by philosophical 
demonstrations, this belongs to the preambles of faith and so this 
meaning of God in the proposition ‘God exists’ can be assented to by 
either faith or reason, but not by both simultaneously. But insofar as 
‘God’ is used as a proper name and is standing in for He Who Is, the 
Tetragrammaton, or any other proper name that has been divinely 
revealed, then the proposition ‘God exists’ can only be assented to as 
true by faith, for such names belong to the articles of faith and are 
inaccessible to philosophical knowledge. Furthermore, insofar as the 
believer assents to the proposition ‘God exists’, the name ‘God’ for the 
believer implicitly contains more than can ever be demonstrated about 
God by philosophy, and it is this assent by faith that secures the 
believer’s salvation. Finally, the assent of faith is formally different 
from the assent of scientific knowledge, for the formal aspect of the 
assent of faith is grounded in the trust of the believer who believes God 
(credere Deo), but the assent of scientific knowledge is formally 
grounded in the understood middle term of a demonstrative syllogism. 
When ‘God exists’ means the ‘first uncaused cause exists’ or ‘pure act 
philosophical knowledge of God as Qui Est. To verify this contention, however, 
would require an independent exegetical study of its own.
25 STh I, q. 4 aa. 1–3; I, q. 13 aa. 1-6.
26 STh I, q. 13 a. 12.
27 STh I, q. 13 a. 4; q. 13 a. 12.
28 ‘videmus etiam compositiones per alia accidentia verbi et nominis variari.’ De 
Ver q. 14 a. 12 (Leonine vol. 22/2, p. 473: 32-34).
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of subsisting existence exists’ and is known as a demonstrated 
conclusion, then the assent is formally grounded in a demonstrative 
syllogism and the proposition belongs to the preambles of faith. When 
‘God exists’ means the ‘He who is named by the Tetragrammaton 
exists’, this proposition belongs to the articles of faith because it can 
only be known by faith in divine revelation, and the assent by faith is 
formally grounded in the believer’s trust in God, for they believe God 
(credere Deo).29
In short, FT contends that Thomas provides more than sufficient 
evidence to support their claim that minor alterations, even in the way in 
which the name ‘God’ is signified, completely change the meaning of 
the proposition, and so also the formal grounds of the assent. Hence, 
these distinctions completely undermine what appeared to be RT’s most 
decisive refutation of Thesis-1. Given these distinctions, FT also 
concludes that they have demonstrated that Thesis-1 is true and that it is 
supported by the texts of Thomas.
RT’s Brief Rejoinder to FT’s Reply to Argument RT.2
RT’s rejoinder to this reply will be brief. First, even though FT has 
presented a reasonable way to show that Thesis-1 does not entail a 
contradiction, a number of exegetical concerns still linger. It is not clear 
that Thomas Aquinas would accept FT’s use of his doctrine of divine 
names, theory of propositions, and other aspects of Thomas’s 
philosophy of language to support their construal of the harmony of 
faith and reason. To answer these exegetical worries, however, would 
require a detailed investigation that cannot be taken up here.
Second, even if RT is willing to concede that FT’s rejoinder to the 
second argument provides a way to understand Thesis-1 that avoids a 
contradiction, it should be pointed out that Thesis-1 has been 
significantly revised in the process of responding to the objections of
RT. In other words, in order to defend Thesis-1 FT was compelled to 
qualify its initial formulation of Thesis-1. And this last point brings us to 
the conclusion of this study.
29 One might develop this point further by considering our second-person 
knowledge of God, which is not a kind of philosophical knowledge of God, see 
Eleonore Stump, ‘Eternity, Simplicity, and Presence’ in The Science of Being as 
Being, pp. 243–263; Andrew Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s 
Ethics: Virtues and Gifts (New York: Routledge, 2012).
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4. Concluding Remarks
The dialectic between FT and RT has introduced a number of 
illuminating qualifications with respect to Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of 
the harmony of faith and reason. It has come to light that FT’s initial 
formulation of the Thesis-1 was quite misleading and that the proper 
understanding of it required taking into account a number of nuances 
that were not adequately articulated in Thesis-1. Whereas the initial 
formulation of Thesis-1 appeared to contend that the exact same 
proposition could be assented to simultaneously by both faith and 
reason, it turns out that this was not the position of FT. On the contrary, 
FT maintains that it is important to clarify what the name ‘God’ means 
in the proposition ‘God exists’ as assented to by faith and by reason. For 
the assent by reason, ‘God’ is not a proper name, but signifies the divine 
nature as it can be demonstrated to exist by philosophical arguments. 
God as He can be named and known in this way belongs to preambles of 
faith and so it can be assented to by faith or reason, but not by both 
simultaneously. But, according to FT, all Christians must also assent to 
the existence of God where the name ‘God’ implicitly signifies a proper 
name, such as He Who Is or He who is named by the Tetragrammaton, 
and such names belong, at least implicitly, to the articles of faith and can 
only be assented to by faith in divine revelation.
RT’s Thesis-2 has not undergone any significant qualifications, but 
RT has conceded that certain texts of Thomas do challenge some 
features of RT’s position and that, given certain qualifications, a revised 
version of Thesis-1 is not contradictory. Consequently, a more precise 
formulation of Thesis-2 is also available that emphasizes its potential 
compatibility with a revised version of Thesis-1 and allows RT to avoid 
the aforementioned unfitting consequence concerning the certitude of 
faith.
Based on the qualifications introduced in the foregoing dialectic the 
following revised versions of Theses 1 and 2 provide a much more 
accurate presentation of the positions of FT and RT insofar as they are 
both willing to accept more nuanced versions of their respective 
positions:
Thesis-1*: All believers must assent to the existence of God by 
faith, but one and the same person can simultaneously 
assent to the proposition ‘God exists’ by both faith and 
reason insofar as reason assents to ‘God exists’ as a 
truth that belongs to the preambles of faith and faith 
assents to ‘God exists’ as a truth that belongs to the 
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articles of faith, where the latter contains implicitly all 
the revealed truths pertaining to God’s existence, most 
of which cannot be known by philosophy
Thesis-2*: All believers must assent to the existence of God, but it 
is impossible for one and the same person to assent to 
this doctrine simultaneously by both faith and reason 
insofar as both are assenting to the proposition ‘God 
exists’ as it belongs to the preambles of faith
As stated, both of these revised theses are compatible with each other, 
and insofar as FT and RT are willing to accept Thesis-1* and Thesis-2* 
as accurate portrayals of their interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’s 
doctrine of the harmony of faith and reason, then it turns out that the 
interpretations of faith and reason presented by Fideist Thomists and
Rationalist Thomists can be harmonized as well.30
30 I would like to thank all the conference attendees who provided me with 
helpful feedback on my presentation at Utrecht. In particular, I must thank John 
O’Callaghan for providing me with some very helpful suggestions on how to 
improve my thesis. I would also like to thank the editors of this volume for their 
judicious comments and recommendations on my paper.
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